We study the competition of two strategic agents for liquidity in the benchmark portfolio tracking setup of Bank et al. [5] , both facing common aggregated temporary and permanent price impactà la Almgren and Chriss [2] . The resulting stochastic linear quadratic differential game with terminal state constraints allows for an explicitly available open-loop Nash equilibrium in feedback form. Our results reveal how the equilibrium strategies of the two players take into account the other agent's trading targets: either in an exploitative intent or by providing liquidity to the competitor, depending on the ratio between temporary and permanent price impact. As a consequence, different behavioral patterns can emerge as optimal in equilibrium. These insights complement existing studies in the literature on predatory trading models examined in the context of optimal portfolio liquidation problems.
Introduction
The confrontation of financial agents concurrently trading in a single risky asset and adversely affecting its execution price through common aggregated temporary and permanent price impact is a well-known problem in optimal portfolio liquidation. Indeed, when a possibly financially distressed institutional investor aims to liquidate a large portfolio position in a risky asset, another strategic trader's awareness of the investor's intentions might tempt her to also trade in the risky asset in order to benefit from the incurred price impact. Typically, one might expect a predatory trading activity: Like a prey the distressed investor is raced to the market by a predator who initially trades in parallel in the same direction solely to unwind her accrued position eventually at more favorable prices due to the induced price impact, and at the expense of the liquidating investor. But, is it also conceivable to observe a converse behaviour where an agent actually cooperates and provides liquidity by buying some of the seller's shares -or even engages in both occasional predation as well as cooperation? Among the first game theoretic approaches carried out to formulate and investigate possible phenomena in this context of portfolio liquidation are, e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen [6] , Attari et al. [4] , Carlin et al. [8] , Schöneborn [22] , Schöneborn and Schied [23] , Carmona and Yang [9] , and Schied and Zhang [19] .
Our goal in this paper is to expand these works and to address above question by studying the competition of two strategic agents for liquidity when both agents are trading simultaneously in an illiquid risky asset affected by price impact because each agent seeks to track her own exogenously given stochastic target strategy like, e.g., a frictionless delta hedge to dynamically hedge the fluctuations of their random endowments. Specifically, we extend the single-player cost optimal benchmark portfolio tracking problem studied in Bank et al. [5] in the presence of temporary and permanent price impact as proposed by Almgren and Chriss [2] to a two-player stochastic differential game. Both strategic agents are fully aware of the opponent's individual tracking objectives and they compete for available liquidity as the jointly caused price impact on the execution price directly feeds into their trading performances. We also allow for individual stochastic terminal state constraints on each agent's final portfolio position. Our aim is to shed light on the strategic interplay between the agents and to make transparent how each agent takes into account the other agent's trading targets in an optimal cost minimizing manner by solving for a Nash equilibrium in this two-player price impact game.
The paper most closely related to ours is Schied and Zhang [19] . Therein the authors determine a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium within the class of deterministic strategies of agents aiming to liquidate a given asset position by maximizing a mean-variance criterion in an Almgren and Chriss [2] framework. Their study is an extension of the corresponding deterministic differential game solved in Carlin et al. [8] of liquidating risk-neutral agents who maximize expected revenues. Other extensions of the latter game include, e.g., Schöneborn and Schied [23] and Carmona and Yang [9] : Both consider a two-stage version of the model in Carlin et al. [8] by allowing for different time horizons among the agents. While Schöneborn and Schied [23] investigate the qualitative behaviour of the resulting deterministic open-loop Nash equilibrium, Carmona and Yang [9] numerically analyze closed-loop Nash equilibrium strategies; see also Moallemi et al. [17] for an extension of the differential game in [8] with asymmetric information, or to the case of multiple assets in Chu et al. [12] . By contrast to these papers, we additionally allow the agents to track their own general predictable target strategies as in the single-player case investigated in [5] . Facing the same time horizon, the players' terminal portfolio positions are also restricted to some exogenously predetermined stochastic levels which reveal gradually over time. As a consequence, both agents will choose their dynamic trading strategies from a suitable set of adapted stochastic processes rather than opting for static strategies from a set of deterministic functions as in the papers cited above (except for the numerical study in Carmona and Yang [9] ). Other recent work on price impact games with Almgren-Chriss type price impact include, e.g., Huang et al. [16] , Casgrain and Jaimungal [10, 11] where agents pursue optimal liquidation or trading and interact through common aggregated permanent price impact; Ekren and Nadtochiy [14] describe an equilibrium between competing market makers with constant absolute risk aversion who are intertwined through jointly incurred temporary price impact while hedging fractions of the same European option in a Markovian framework. Price impact games of liquidating agents in a market model with transient price impact are analyzed, e.g., in Schied and Zhang [20] , Schied et al. [21] , and Strehle [24] .
Our main result is an explicit description of a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium in feedback form within the class of progressively measurable strategies to our two-player stochastic differential game where both agents track their own target strategies as in [5] and interact through temporary and permanent price impact as in [19] and [8] . Mathematically, we solve a symmetric linear quadratic stochastic differential game with random state constraints. Inspired by the analysis in [5] , we follow a probabilistic and convex-analytic approach in the style of Pontryagin's stochastic maximum principle. This also allows us to consider general predictable strategies as the agents' tracking targets and not necessarily Markovian or continuous diffusion-type processes. We derive a characterization of the Nash equilibrium which takes the form of a coupled system of linear forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). Solving this system provides us with the agents' optimal trading strategies in equilibrium in closed-form and unveils a rich phenomenology for their optimal behaviour.
It turns out that in equilibrium, similar to the single-player solution presented in [5] , both agents anticipate their individual running target portfolio by gradually trading in the direction of a weighted average of expected future target positions of the target strategy. However, being aware of the competitor's tracking goals, each agent also assesses a weighted average of the expected future positions of the opponent's target strategy and chooses to trade accordingly. Interestingly, it arises that the agents' trading directions with respect to the adversary's target strategy is not invariant but depends on the relation between temporary and permanent price impact. Indeed, as it becomes apparent from our explicit solution both predation by simultaneously trading in the same direction as the opponent, as well as cooperation by trading in the opposite direction can occur, even in a coexisting manner. As a consequence, different behavioral paradigms can emerge as optimal in our Nash equilibrium.
Conceptually, our explicit results elaborate on the analysis carried out by Schöneborn and Schied [23] . Therein the authors identify two distinct types of illiquid markets: A plastic market where the price impact is predominantly permanent, and an elastic market where the major part of incurred price impact is temporary. Their model predicts that a competitor who is conscious of the other agent's liquidation intention engages in predatory trading in a plastic market, while she tends to cooperate and provides liquidity in an elastic market. Our closed-form Nash equilibrium solution of our more general price impact game corroborates this. The novelty of our contribution comes from the fact that in our game setup even though both agents share the same time horizon the various behavioral patterns of coexisting liquidity provision as well as preying in equilibrium arise due to the agents' tracking objectives which incorporate a risk aversion in form of an inventory risk. In fact, this is also already suggested by the deterministic Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimal liquidation in Schied and Zhang [19] . In contrast, the agents in the differential game in Schöneborn and Schied [23] are risk-neutral and cooperation among them is facilitated by introducing a two-stage setup where the agents have different time horizons. Indeed, in the correspond-ing one-stage game from Carlin et al. [8] with same time constraint for all agents only predation in equilibrium is observed and cooperation can only be enforced by repeating the game.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our two-player stochastic differential price impact game by extending the framework of Carlin et al. [8] and Schied and Zhang [19] to a stochastic tracking problem of general predictable target strategies. Our main result, an explicit description of a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium of the game is presented in Section 3. Section 4 contains some illustrations and discusses the qualitative behaviour of the two players' optimal strategies in equilibrium. The technical proofs are deferred to Section 5.
Notation: Throughout this manuscript we use superscripts for enumerating purposes as, e.g., in X 1 , X 2 , α 1 , α 2 , or other quantities like ξ 1 , ξ 2 etc. to mark all objects which are associated with player 1 and player 2, respectively; or, to itemize objects as w 1 , w 2 , w 3 etc. In particular, X 2 , α 2 , ξ 2 is not to be confused with quadratic powers, which will be explicitly denoted with brackets like (α) 2 , or, if necessary, as (α 2 ) 2 .
Problem formulation
Let T > 0 denote a finite deterministic time horizon and fix a filtered probability space (Ω, F , (F t ) 0≤t≤T , P) satisfying the usual conditions of right continuity and completeness. We consider two agents who are trading in a financial market consisting of one risky asset, e.g., a stock. The number of shares agent 1 and agent 2 are holding at time t ∈ [0, T ] are defined, respectively, as
with initial positions x 1 , x 2 ∈ R. The real-valued stochastic processes (α 1 t ) 0≤t≤T and (α 2 t ) 0≤t≤T represent the turnover rate at which each agent trades in the risky asset and belong to the admissibility set
We adopt the framework from Carlin et al. [8] and Schied and Zhang [19] and suppose that the agents' trading incurs linear temporary and permanent price impactà la Almgren and Chriss [2] in the sense that trades in the risky asset are executed at prices
with some unaffected price process P · = P 0 + √ σW · following a Brownian motion (W t ) 0≤t≤T with variance σ > 0. The trading of both agents in the risky asset consumes available liquidity and instantaneously affects the execution price in (3) in an adverse manner through temporary price impact λ > 0. In addition, the agents' total accumulated trading activity also leaves a trace in the execution price which is captured by the permanent price impact parameter γ > 0.
Similar to the single-agent setup in Bank et al. [5] we assume that agent 1 and agent 2 are trading in this illiquid risky asset because each agent seeks to track her own exogenously given target strategy (ξ 1 t ) 0≤t≤T and (ξ 2 t ) 0≤t≤T , respectively. Both processes ξ 1 and ξ 2 are supposed to be real-valued predictable processes in L 2 (P⊗dt) and can be thought of, for instance, as hedging strategies adopted from a frictionless market. Moreover, the agents are also required to reach a predetermined terminal portfolio target position Ξ 1 T and Ξ 2 T in L 2 (P, F T ) at time T . Mathematically, we can formalize their objectives as follows: For a given strategy (α 2 t ) 0≤t≤T of her competitor agent 2, agent 1 aims to choose her trading rate (α 1 t ) 0≤t≤T in order to minimize the cost functional
whereas agent 2 wishes to minimize
via her trading rate (α 2 t ) 0≤t≤T in response to a given strategy (α 1 t ) 0≤t≤T of her opponent agent 1. As in the single-agent problem in Bank et al. [5] , the first term in (4) and (5) reflects the agents' running after their individual target strategies ξ 1 and ξ 2 , respectively, through minimizing the corresponding square deviation from their respective portfolio positions X 1 and X 2 . The common weight parameter σ measures price fluctuations of the underlying unaffected price process. The second and third terms in (4) and (5) take into account the additional incurred linear quadratic illiquidity costs which are induced by temporary and permanent price impact while both agents are trading in the risky asset as stipulated in (3) (see also Carlin et al. [8] and Schied and Zhang [19] ). Note, however, that due to each agent's individual terminal state constraint X i T = Ξ i T P-a.s. (for i = 1, 2) only the competitor's accrued permanent price impact feeds into their respective cost functional. Indeed, integration by parts yields that the i-th agent's permanent impact from her own trading always creates the same costs γ(
independent of her chosen trading rate and therefore can be neglected in her own objective functional. We obtain following individual optimal stochastic control problems for agent 1 and agent 2, namely,
for any fixed strategy α 2 ∈ A 2 , and
for any fixed strategy α 1 ∈ A 1 , where A i , i = 1, 2, is the set of constraint policies defined as
As in Bank et al. [5] we further assume that the target positions Ξ 1
1. Similar to Carlin et al. [8] and Schied and Zhang [19] the agent's individual optimization problems in (6) and (7) are intertwined through common aggregated temporary and permanent price impact affecting their performance functionals J 1 and J 2 in (4) and (5) (in contrast to, e.g, Huang et al. [16] , Casgrain and Jaimungal [10, 11] or Ekren and Nadtochiy [14] where agents only interact through permanent or temporary price impact, respectively). One can think of both players as strategic agents who compete for liquidity while concurrently trading in a single illiquid risky asset to meet their tracking objectives for the purpose of, e.g., hedging fluctuations of random endowments. Note that both agents are fully aware of the opponent's trading targets ξ i and Ξ i T (i = 1, 2), as well as the jointly caused price impact on the execution prices in (3) . That is, our game is one of complete information as in the related studies in Brunnermeier and Pedersen [6] , Carlin et al. [8] , Schöneborn and Schied [23] , Carmona and Yang [9] , and Schied and Zhang [19] . (4) and (5) we refer to the single-player optimization problems studied, e.g., in Rogers and Singh [18] , Almgren and Li [3] , Bank et al. [5] , and Cai et al. [7] . Observe that the square tracking error also incorporates a risk aversion on each player's inventory. In this regard, both agents are homogeneous in their inventory risk. Allowing for different risk aversion parameters as, e.g., in Herdegen et al. [15] , is conceivable but beyond the scope of the present study. Indeed, in light of the analysis in Schied and Zhang [19] we expect that this asymmetry rules out a closed-form solution for the stochastic differential game, which is our primary focus of interest.
For further motivation for the tracking cost functionals in
3. Analog to the study in Bank et al. [5] the assumption in (9) will ensure that A i = ∅ for i = 1, 2 (cf. also the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Section 5 below). In fact, for given random variables Ξ i T ∈ L 2 (P, F T ) only known at time T the terminal state constraint X i T = Ξ i T P-a.s. (i = 1, 2) is quite demanding. Thus, loosely speaking, the condition in (9) requires that the speed at which information on the random ultimate target positions Ξ 1 T , Ξ 2 T is revealed as t ↑ T is sufficiently fast. Our goal is to compute a Nash equilibrium in which both agents solve their minimization problems in (6) and (7) simultaneously, given the strategy of her competitor, in the following sense:
an open-loop Nash equilibrium if for all admissible strategies α 1 ∈ A 1 and
In other words, in a Nash equilibrium neither player has an incentive to deviate from the chosen strategy. 1. In the special case of optimally liquidating the agents' initial risky asset holdings x 1 , x 2 ∈ R without tracking exogenously given target strategies, i.e., ξ 1 ≡ ξ 2 ≡ 0, and with non-random terminal target positions Ξ 1 T = Ξ 2 T = 0 P-almost surely, the above formulated two-player (deterministic) differential game is solved in Carlin et al. [8] setting σ = 0 in the performance functionals in (4) and (5), and in Schied and Zhang [19] allowing for σ > 0 instead. In both studies, the authors obtain a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium in the sense of Definition 2.2 in closed form within the class of deterministic strategies.
2. Two-stage extensions of the model in Carlin et al. [8] with risk-neutral agents, i.e., σ = 0 in (4) and (5), are studied, e.g., in Schöneborn and Schied [23] , and Carmona and Yang [9] by allowing for different time horizons between both agents. The former determines a unique deterministic open-loop Nash equilibrium whereas the latter numerically analyzes a closed-loop Nash equilibrium.
Main result
Our main result is an explicit description of a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium in the sense of Definition 2.2 of the two-player stochastic differential game formulated in Section 2. To state our result it is convenient to introduce following nonnegative constants
the nonnegative functions
such that lim t↑T c ± t = +∞, as well as the weight functions
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. We are now ready to state our main theorem:
2 t dt of agent 2 satisfy the random linear coupled ODÊ
where, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , we let
with nonnegative kernels
which, for each t ∈ [0, T ), integrate to one over [t, T ]. The solution (X 1 ,X 2 ) of (13) satisfies the terminal state constraints in the sense that 
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is deferred to Section 5. The equilibrium stock holdings prescribed by the linear coupled ODE in (13) can be easily computed explicitly.
Corollary 3.2. The solution (X 1 ,X 2 ) to the linear ODE in (13) is given bŷ
and, similarly, bŷ (14) and (15) , which in turn implies that the Nash equilibrium trading rates in (13) and the corresponding stock holdings in (18) and (19) are deterministic.
Following simple properties of the weight functions introduced in (12) will help enlightening the structure of the Nash equilibrium presented in Theorem 3.1. weighted averages of −ξ 2 . Loosely speaking, the former case can be viewed as a predatory trading action of the first agent against the second agent: By trading in the same direction she is racing her adversary to the market in order to benefit from more favorable prices (due to the induced price impact) when unwinding at a later point in time the corresponding accrued position in accordance with the known competitor's trading needs. The latter case, on the other hand, can be regarded as a cooperative behaviour: By trading simultaneously in the opposite direction, she provides liquidity to her opponent. The same applies to the optimal signalξ 2 of the second player in (15) due to symmetry. In our illustrations in Section 4 below it becomes apparent that both these cases depend on the relationship between the permanent and temporary price impact parameters γ and λ. This is in line with the study of an optimal liquidation problem in Schöneborn and Schied [23] , where the authors identify two distinct types of illiquid markets: A plastic maket where γ λ and an elastic market with λ γ. They predict that competitors who are aware of other market participants' trading intentions engage in predatory trading in plastic markets, while they tend to provide liquidity in elastic markets; both in the above sense of trading in the same or opposite direction. Our case studies in Section 4 illustrate how these two market types, plastic and elastic, correlate accordingly with the sizes of the weights w 3 and w 4 ; we refer to the graphical illustration in Figure 6 below (note, however, that the dependence of the functions w 3 , w 4 on γ and λ, as well as their interrelations with σ and T are nontrivial). In this regard, depending on the illiquidity parameters the optimal signal processesξ 1 in (14) andξ 2 in (15) account for different types of regimes. It turns out that this leads to qualitative different behavioral patterns in the Nash equilibrium of Theorem 3.1 where both predation and cooperation between the agents can occur in a coexisting manner (see Section 4 below). This differs remarkably from the dichotomie in the existing literature where either predation or cooperation is observed in equilibrium, with the latter essentially being enforced through repeating the game or by allowing for different trading horizons among the agents as, e.g., in Carlin et al. [8] and Schöneborn and Schied [23] . This is due to the fact that the agents in the above cited work are risk-neutral and maximize expected revenues. In contrast, in our stochastic differential price impact game formulation in Section 2 agents are sensitive about their inventories. This induces a form of risk-aversion which leads to a richer variety of different behavior in equilibrium for different model parameters; see also the study of liquidating agents with mean-variance preferences by Schied and Zhang [19] which is a special case of our setup.
Finally, observe that the optimal signal processes in (14) and (15) also forecast both player's terminal target positions Ξ 1 T and Ξ 2 T . However, one can argue that w 1 > w 2 on [0, T ) independent of γ and λ (we refer to the graphical illustration in Figure 6 below for simplicity). That is, regarding the opponent's terminal portfolio position each agent only pursues predatory trading.
Remark 3.5 (Open-loop vs. closed-loop). Note that the open-loop Nash equilibrium strategies in Theorem 3.1 are given in feedback form of the state variablesX 1 andX 2 . In principle, this allows each player to react dynamically to the other player's state variable and to adapt if the opponent decides to deviate from the equilibrium strategy. However, it does not necessarily imply that the adapting player still reacts optimally in response to the other player's deviation in this case. Recall that in a closed-loop stochastic differential game solving for each player's optimal strategy is performed over a set of feedback policies and the other player's strategy is likewise fixed as a deterministic feedback function of the random state variables; in contrast to the general stochastic processes considered in Definition 2.2. Our solution in (13) suggests to search for a closed-loop Nash equilibrium for our stochastic differential game where the strategies are fixed as feedback controls of the state variables (X 1 t , X 2 t ) augmented by the (uncontrolled) target positions (ξ 1 t , ξ 2 t ) (under the additional assumption that (F t ) 0≤t≤T is their natural filtration). Nonetheless, we expect that a closed-loop equilibrium does not exhibit any new qualitative features; see also the heuristic analysis in Carlin et al. [8, Appendix B] and the discussion in Schöneborn and Schied [23] .
Illustrations
In this section we present some case studies to illustrate the qualitative behaviour of the two-player Nash equilibrium presented in Theorem 3.1.
Optimal liquidation revisited
We start with revisiting the differential game of optimal portfolio liquidation studied in Schied and Zhang [19] . Specifically, the first agent seeks to liquidate her initial portfolio position of x 1 = 1 shares in the risky asset by time T = 2 and hence requires her terminal position to satisfy Ξ 1 T = 0 P-a.s. at final time. Vigilant about her stock holdings and in line with her selling intention she also wants her inventory to be close to 0 throughout by tracking ξ 1 ≡ 0 on [0, T ]. The second agent, on the contrary, does not pursue any predetermined buying or selling objectives but solely chooses to trade in the risky asset because she knows about the intentions of the first liquidating agent. That is, possessing no shares at time 0 (x 2 = 0) she gives herself the constraints ξ 2 t = Ξ 2 T = 0 P-a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ]. In this case, following Theorem 3.1, we haveξ 1 ≡ξ 2 ≡ 0 P-a.s. on [0, T ] in (14) and (15) , and the deterministic equilibrium trading rates of both players in (13) reduce tô
on [0, T ); cf. also the result in Schied and Zhang [19, Corollary 2.6] with a slightly different representation. We observe in (20) that the first agent's portfolio positionX 1 t is not gradually reverting towards 0 but takes the effect of the second agent's actions into account via the correction term −w 5 tX 2 t . Similarly, concerning the second agent, it is optimal for her to systematically trade in the direction of the liquidating agent's current portfolio positionX 1 t weighted with w 5 t ∈ (−1, 1). As shown in Figure 1 , this yields to predation on the first agent in a plastic market where, e.g., γ = 2 > 1 = λ. Indeed, during the first half of the trading period she short-sells the risky asset in parallel to the selling of the first agent and then steadily unwinds her accrued short position by buying back shares to become "hands-clean" by final time T . In contrast, in an elastic market with, e.g., γ = 0.01 < 1 = λ, the Nash equilibrium strategy dictates the second agent to cooperate with the seller and to moderately buy almost up to one-tenth of the shares by time T /2 agent 1 is concurrently selling before starting liquidating her portfolio to finish up with zero inventory at T . Note that the weight function w 5 · in (20) flips sign depending on the market's illiquidity regime (see also Figure 6 for a graphical illustration of the weight functions). As a consequence, compared to the single-player optimal liquidation strategyX t = 1 + t 0α s ds, t ∈ [0, T ], which satisfieŝ
(cf., e.g., Almgren [1] ), and does not depend on γ, we observe in Figure 1 that, due to the presence of the second agent's trading activity which directly feeds into the first agent's turnover rateα 1 via −w 5X 2 in (20), her optimal portfolio liquidation strategy becomes more prudent in a plastic market and slightly more aggressive in an elastic market environment. To sum up, in equilibrium, depending on the illiquid market type, either predation or cooperation between both agents occurs; see also the discussion in Schied and Zhang [19, Section 3].
Piecewise constant inventory targets
The next two case studies are again simple deterministic examples but this time with nonzero optimal signal processesξ 1 andξ 2 .
In the first example, as in the optimal liquidation problem above, we suppose that agent 2 only trades in the risky asset because of her awareness of the trading activity of the first agent. That is, with x 2 = 0 initial shares her inventory targets are ξ 2 t = Ξ 2 T = 0 P-a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Concerning the first agent, starting with no inventory x 1 = 0 she wants to follow a stock-buying schedule over a time period of T = 10 that prescribes to hold one stock until time T /2 and then to double and hold her position up to time T . Her inventory target is thus ξ 1 t = 1 · 1 {0≤t<5} + 2 · 1 {5≤t≤10} on [0, T ] with terminal constraint Ξ 1 T = 2. Note that in this game setup the optimal signal processesξ 1 andξ 2 of both agents in (14) and (15) in equilibrium are nonzero. In particular, similar to the single-player case in Bank et al. [5] they are anticipating and smoothing out the jump in ξ 1 at time T /2 via the averaging through the kernels K 1 and K 2 . The associated Nashequilibrium trading strategiesX 1 andX 2 from Theorem 3.1 are presented in Figure 2 . As expected from the liquidation problem above, if the market is plastic (γ > λ) the second agent heavily preys on the first agent by trading halfway of the trading period in the same direction and buying shares. Accordingly, in comparison to the first agent's single-player optimal tracking strategy from Bank et al. [5] (which does not dependent on γ) her running after the buying-schedule ξ 1 gets affected due to the presence of the preying second agent and slightly falls behind in the second half of the trading period (also recall the adjustmentξ 1 − w 5X 2 of the first agent's optimal signal process in her trading rate in (13) ). However, if the market is elastic (λ > γ) the second agent's optimal behaviour in equilibrium changes. Interestingly, we observe that her strategy turns out to be a succession of round-trips during which she either provides liquidity to her opponent by short-selling the risky asset like, e.g., during the first quarter of the trading period, or engages in Figure 2 : The two-player Nash equilibrium strategiesX 1 for Player 1 (green) andX 2 for Player 2 (orange), together with the processesξ i − w 5X j (i = j ∈ {1, 2}) from the optimal trading rates in (13) (same-color dashed lines). The first agent's buying programm ξ 1 = 1 [0,5) + 2 · 1 [5, 10] is plotted in grey. For comparison, the corresponding single-player optimal tracking strategy with associated optimal signal process from [5] is depicted in black (solid and dashed). The parameters are T = 10, σ = 1, λ = 1, as well as γ = 2 (upper panel), γ = 0.1 (lower panel). predatory trading by concurrently building up some inventory in parallel to her adversary's buying efforts as it is the case during the second quarter of the trading period. Thus, compared to the first agent's single-player optimal strategy, she suitably buys slightly faster and slower in the two-player setup.
Overall, it turns out that predation and cooperation coexist in equilibrium in this case.
As a second example, let us examine the situation where both agents with zero initial inventory x 1 = x 2 = 0 seek to gradually build up and hold a positive fraction of the risky asset over some time period [0, T ] with T = 10. Concretely, assume that ξ 1 ≡ Ξ 1 T = 1 and ξ 2 ≡ Ξ 2 T = 0.1, i.e., agent 1 wants her inventory to be close to 1 and ten times larger than the desired inventory level of agent 2 all through the trading period [0, T ]. The associated Nash equilibrium strategiesX 1 andX 2 from Theorem 3.1 are presented in Figure 3 . Again, as expected from the analysis above, in a plastic market it is optimal for agent 2 to excessively prey on the first agent who aims for a much larger asset position by buying up to three times more shares than her actual target inventory predetermines. In response, the acquisition of the first agent is slowed down compared to her single-player optimal strategy from [5] . By contrast, in an elastic market environment it turns out to be optimal for the second agent to initially ignore her own tracking target and to trade away from her desired inventory level in order to provide liquidity to the higher-volume seeking first agent by short-selling some shares. Also note how in this case the second agent's single-player optimal tracking strategy from [5] strongly differs from her optimal behaviour in the two-player Nash equilibrium at the beginning of the trading period.
Running after the delta
In the final two examples we want to investigate a situation where the target strategies ξ 1 and ξ 2 are adapted stochastic processes. Specifically, let us suppose that the first agent wants to hedge an at-the-money call option with maturity T on the underlying unaffected price process P in (3) by tracking the corresponding frictionless (Bachelier-)delta-hedging strategy
Here, Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. We further suppose that her initial position in the risky asset 
Number of Shares
Elastic Market Figure 3 : The two-player Nash equilibrium strategiesX 1 for Player 1 (green) andX 2 for Player 2 (orange), together with the processesξ i − w 5X j (i = j ∈ {1, 2}) from the optimal trading rates in (13) (same-color dashed lines). Both agent's inventory targets ξ 1 ≡ 1 and ξ 2 ≡ 0.1 are plotted in grey. For comparison, the corresponding single-player optimal tracking strategies with associated optimal signal processes from [5] are depicted in black (solid and dashed). The parameters are T = 10, σ = 1, λ = 1, as well as γ = 2 (upper panel), γ = 0.1 (lower panel).
coincides with the frictionless delta x 1 = ξ 1 0 = 1/2 and that Ξ 1 T = 0 P-a.s., i.e., she wants to systematically unwind her hedging portfolio when approaching maturity T .
Firstly, we assume that the second agent does not pursue any specific predetermined trading objectives, that is, x 2 = ξ 2 = Ξ 2 T = 0 P-a.s. Since ξ 1 in (22) is a martingale on [0, T ] the optimal signal processesξ 1 andξ 2 in (14) and (15) simplify tô
The Nash equilibrium strategiesX 1 andX 2 from Theorem 3.1 are plotted in Figure 4 , together with the corresponding realisation of the delta-hedge ξ 1 in the case where the call option expires in the money. Depending on the illiquidity parameters, we observe the same behavioral patterns in equilibrium as in the deterministic cases analyzed above: In a plastic market environment, the second agent engages in predatory trading on the first agent by trading in parallel in the same direction of the delta-hedge. When the market is elastic she turns into a liquidity provider instead and partially takes the opposite side of the hedger's transactions. Also note that the sign of the second agent's optimal signal process in (23) is determined by the relation between the weights w 3 and w 4 , which is in turn affected by the ratio between γ and λ (cf. also Figure 6 ). Secondly, let us now assume that the second agent also hedges a onetenth fraction of the same call option, i.e., ξ 2 = ξ 1 /10 (with initial and final portfolio positions x 2 = 1/20 and Ξ 2 T = 0 P-a.s.). The resulting Nash equilibrium strategies from Theorem 3.1 are presented in Figure 5 where we used the same realisation of the delta-hedge as in Figure 4 . In a similar vein as in the deterministic case above, the second agent's optimal behaviour in the two-player Nash equilibrium changes notably compared to her optimal single-player frictional hedging strategy from Bank et al. [5] ; focussing more on preying on the first agent's larger hedging portfolio in a plastic market, or on providing liquidity to the latter in an elastic market.
Proofs
Inspired by Bank et al. [5] we will use tools from convex analysis and simple calculus of variations arguments to prove our main Theorem 3.1. Indeed, note that for any α 2 ∈ A 2 fixed, the map α 1 → J 1 (α 1 , α 2 ) in (4) is strictly Figure 4 : The two-player Nash equilibrium strategiesX 1 for Player 1 (green) andX 2 for Player 2 (orange), together with the processesξ i − w 5X j (i = j ∈ {1, 2}) from the optimal trading rates in (13) (same-color dashed lines). The first agent's frictionless delta-hedge ξ 1 is plotted in grey. For comparison, her corresponding single-player optimal hedging strategy with associated optimal signal process from [5] is depicted in black (solid and dashed). The parameters are T = 5, σ = 1, λ = 1, as well as γ = 2 (upper panel), γ = 0.1 (lower panel). 
Number of Shares
Elastic Market Figure 5 : The two-player Nash equilibrium strategiesX 1 for Player 1 (green) andX 2 for Player 2 (orange), together with the processesξ i − w 5X j (i = j ∈ {1, 2}) from the optimal trading rates in (13) (same-color dashed lines). Only the second agent's frictionless delta-hedge ξ 2 = ξ 1 /10 is plotted in grey (the first agent's target strategy ξ 1 is the same as in Figure 4 and omitted here). For comparison, the corresponding single-player optimal hedging strategies of the two agents together with their associated optimal signal processes from [5] are depicted in black (solid and dashed). The parameters are T = 5, σ = 1, λ = 1, as well as γ = 2 (upper panel), γ = 0.1 (lower panel). convex over the convex set A 1 . Same holds true for the map α 2 → J 2 (α 1 , α 2 ) in (5) over the convex set A 2 for any fixed α 1 ∈ A 1 . As a consequence, we immediately obtain following lemma: Given two controlsα 1 ∈ A 1 ,α 2 ∈ A 2 we can introduce the Gâteaux derivatives of the mappings α 1 → J 1 (α 1 ,α 2 ) at α 1 ∈ A 1 and α 2 → J 2 (α 1 , α 2 ) at α 2 ∈ A 2 , respectively, in any directions β 1 , β 2 ∈ A 0 {β : β ∈ A satisfying T 0 β t dt = 0 P-a.s.}, namely,
allowing for following explicit expressions:
and
for any β 1 , β 2 ∈ A 0 .
Proof. We only compute the Gâteaux derivative in (24) . The same computations apply for (25). Let ε > 0 and α 1 ∈ A 1 , α 2 ∈ A 2 , β 1 ∈ A 0 . Note that X α 1 +εβ 1 · = X α 1 · + ε · 0 β 1 s ds. In fact, since
we obtain the desired result in (24) after applying Fubini's theorem.
Having at hand the explicit expressions in (24) and (25), we can derive a sufficient first order condition for a Nash equilibrium. Lemma 5.3. Suppose that (X 1 ,X 2 ) with controls (α 1 ,α 2 ) ∈ A 1 × A 2 solves following coupled forward backward SDE system
for two suitable square integrable martingales (M 1 t ) 0≤t<T and (M 2 t ) 0≤t<T . Then (α 1 ,α 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium in the sense of Definition 2.2.
Proof. Assume that (X 1 ,X 2 ,α 1 ,α 2 , M 1 , M 2 ) with (α 1 ,α 2 ) ∈ A 1 ×A 2 solves the FBSDE system in (26). We have to show thatα 1 minimizes α 1 → J 1 (α 1 ,α 2 ) over A 1 , and, vice versa, thatα 2 minimizes α 2 → J 2 (α 1 , α 2 ) over A 2 . Since we are minimizing strictly convex functionals, a sufficient condition for the optimality ofα 1 andα 2 , respectively, is given by
and ∇ 2 J 2 (α 1 ,α 2 ), β 2 = 0 for all β 2 ∈ A 0 ;
cf., e.g., Ekeland and Témam [13] . We start with (27). By assumption, we have the representation Hence, as desired, we obtain that the first order optimality condition in (27) is satisfied byα 1 ∈ A 1 . In fact, the same computations apply to show that alsoα 2 ∈ A 2 is satisfying the first order optimality condition in (28). Therefore, we can conclude that (α 1 ,α 2 ) ∈ A 1 × A 2 is a Nash equilibrium in the sense of Definition 2.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. In view of Lemma 5.3 we merely have to show that (X 1 ,X 2 ,α 1 ,α 2 ) with dynamics described in Theorem 3.1, equation (13), is a solution of the FBSDE system in (26) with some suitable square integrable martingales (M 1 t ) 0≤t<T and (M 2 t ) 0≤t<T . Uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium then follows together with Lemma 5.1.
Step 1: We start with computing the dynamics of the controlsα 1 andα 2 in (13). Therefore, it is convenient to rewrite w 1 , w 2 in (12), as well asξ 1 in (14) Proof. Both upper bounds can be verified in a similar fashion as in the proof of Lemma 5.5 in Bank et al. [5] . We will thus omit it here.
